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THE PROTECTION OF PATIENTS
UNDER THE CLAYTON ACT
Elizabeth S. Kraus*
The vast consolidation among health-care providers in the aftermath of
the Affordable Care Act’s enactment has led to much debate over the benefits
of mergers in the health-care industry. In 2016, the Federal Trade
Commission filed motions in federal court to enjoin three hospital mergers
in various parts of the country. This amounted to more challenges to hospital
mergers in a single year than any year in recent history. Though two of these
motions succeeded at the district court level, both were overturned on appeal,
which led many to wonder what the effect of these decisions would be on
future health-care mergers.
While many fear that hospital mergers lead to higher prices for consumers,
there are also those who contend that mergers lead to efficiencies, which
allow merging parties to utilize resources more effectively, increase the
quality of patient care and coordination, and potentially save lives. This Note
argues that the possibility of quality-enhancing or life-saving efficiencies is
worth the risk that consumers see increased prices. To allow mergers that
may realize these types of efficiencies, antitrust enforcement agencies and
courts must begin placing greater weight on merging parties’ efficiency
arguments by easing the current standard. Additionally, in light of new
research suggesting that cross-market health-care mergers, or mergers
between providers in different geographic markets, affect bargaining
dynamics between providers and insurers, this Note argues that parties’
relative bargaining power must be considered in agencies’ and courts’
analyses of the competitive landscape relevant to a merger.
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INTRODUCTION
Competition among health-care providers benefits consumers by
incentivizing firms to offer lower-priced services of higher quality and gives
consumers greater choice.1 Mergers2 have the potential to enhance or harm

1. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (“The
assumption that competition is the best method of allocating resources in a free market
recognizes that all elements of a bargain—quality, service, safety, and durability—and not just
the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity to select among alternative
offers.”).
2. This Note uses the term “merger” to refer to mergers, acquisitions, affiliation
agreements, joint ventures, and similar transactions.
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competition.3 In the United States, the antitrust laws grant power to federal
officials to regulate competition and protect consumers.4 The Department of
Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have the power to
investigate and challenge mergers that are likely to have anticompetitive
effects.5
There are many reasons why health-care providers may seek to merge. A
merged firm may use its resources more efficiently, obtain tax benefits, or
diversify its portfolio to smooth corporate earnings over the business cycle.6
Additionally, hospitals may merge to spread high fixed costs over a larger
patient population,7 coordinate patient care,8 reduce duplicative costs,9 or
avoid penalties imposed by the government for readmitting discharged
patients for continued care of prior illnesses.10 Merging increases the
likelihood that the hospital system will provide all the relevant services for a
patient’s illness and decreases the chance that a patient will be readmitted
because a prior hospital visit failed to provide adequate treatment.11
Firms’ incentives to merge play a crucial role in the antitrust review
conducted by the FTC and DOJ (“the agencies”).12 The agencies seek to
determine the likely effects of a proposed merger.13 This guessing game
requires knowledge of the industry, the way in which the merged firm may
profit, and the benefits that consumers may see.14 The agencies consider all
of this information to determine whether the proposed merger is likely to
substantially lessen competition.15
Mergers that result in high market share and increased market
concentration are presumed to reduce competition and lead to price increases
3. See Peter Bamford et al., Mergers, in A FRAMEWORK FOR THE DESIGN AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 41, 41–44, 49 (1999).
4. See The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws
[https://perma.cc/N87APR7W] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).
5. The
Enforcers,
FED.
TRADE
COMMISSION,
https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/enforcers [https://perma.cc/9VY8-A8CZ]
(last visited Mar. 15, 2018).
6. WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW
OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 460–62 (5th ed. 2016).
7. See Leigh L. Oliver & Robert F. Leibenluft, A Mixed Bag: Sorting Out Efficiencies
Arguments in Hospital Mergers, ANTITRUST, Fall 2015, at 18, 21–22.
8. Id. at 22–23.
9. Id. at 21.
10. William M. Sage, Assembled Products: The Key to More Effective Competition and
Antitrust Oversight in Health Care, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 609, 655 n.216 (2016); Thaddeus J.
Lopatka, Note, Cross-Market Mergers in Healthcare: Adapting Antitrust Regulation to
Address a Growing Concern, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 832–33 (2017).
11. Lopatka, supra note 10, at 833.
12. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §§ 1–2 (2010)
[hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES]; see also Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246
U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“[K]nowledge of intent may help the [adjudicator] to interpret facts and
to predict consequences.”).
13. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, §§ 1–2 (discussing the agencies’
goals during merger investigations and the evidence they rely upon); see also Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
14. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, §§ 1–2.
15. Id. § 1.
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that harm consumers.16 Where harm to competition is small, the agencies
may decline to challenge a merger if they also find that efficiencies,17 which
will benefit consumers, will likely occur.18 Courts may also allow a merger
to be consummated on these grounds but rarely do.19 Courts hesitate to
accept parties’ arguments that future efficiencies will offset the harm to
competition.20 Alternatively, the agencies have argued that efficiencies will
not justify an otherwise highly anticompetitive merger.21
This Note argues that courts need to give greater weight to hospitals’
efficiency arguments and parties’ relative bargaining power because
efficiencies in hospital mergers are worth the risk of higher prices.
Additionally, parties’ relative bargaining power is a necessary consideration
for understanding the relationship between merging health-care providers
and their competitors.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the antitrust laws, the mergerreview process, and new evidence explaining the effects of cross-market
hospital mergers on competition. Part II discusses the evolution of the
efficiency defense, arguments for and against placing greater weight on
parties’ efficiency arguments, and common efficiency arguments presented
by merging hospitals in court and why they fail. Finally, Part III suggests
how courts should interpret parties’ efficiency arguments. Part III also
proposes a new efficiency argument that the agencies and courts should
consider in their review of mergers.

16. Id. § 2.1.3.
17. Common efficiencies that may result following a hospital merger include improved
quality of care, upgraded facilities and equipment, and better utilization of hospital capacity.
See MONICA NOETHER & SEAN MAY, HOSPITAL MERGER BENEFITS: VIEWS FROM HOSPITAL
LEADERS AND ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 4–10 (2017), http://www.crai.com/sites/default/
files/publications/Hospital-Merger-Full-Report-_FINAL-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R7R7KAVL].
18. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, § 10; see also Richard D. Raskin &
Bruce M. Zessar, Telling the Efficiencies Story: Practical Lessons from the Hospital Merger
Field, ANTITRUST, Spring 1999, 21, 21 (noting that “the agencies recognize that efficiencies
generated by a merger may lead to lower prices, improved quality, enhanced service, or new
products”).
19. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.–Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775,
789 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[N]one of the reported appellate decisions have actually held that
[merging parties] rebutted a prima facie case with an efficiencies defense . . . .”).
20. See id. at 789–90. Agencies, however, have allowed transactions to proceed where
potential efficiencies outweighed the potential harm to competition. See Edith Ramirez,
Chairwoman, FTC, Remarks at the Ninth Annual Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium:
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines Five Years Later 11 (Sept. 29, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/805441/ramirez__georgetown_antitrust_enforcement_symposium_9-29-15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5NR9ZYS9].
21. See Brief of Appellees the United States of America and Plaintiff States at 28, United
States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (No. 17-5024) (“The policy of the
antitrust laws—including Section 7—bars the argument that anticompetitive effects promote
consumer welfare and thus justify an anticompetitive merger.”); Brief of the Federal Trade
Commission and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania at 28, FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med.
Ctr., 838 F.3d 327 (3d Cir. 2016) (No. 16-2365).
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I. MERGERS ARE SUBJECT TO ANTITRUST REVIEW
To understand the way in which agencies and courts currently analyze
mergers, it is necessary to understand the purposes of the antitrust laws, why
the antitrust laws were enacted, and how the agencies and courts have
interpreted them. Part I.A discusses the historical beginnings of the antitrust
laws as they relate to potentially anticompetitive mergers. Part I.B explains
the merger-review process. Part I.C then discusses the substance of the
agencies’ merger review, specifically in the context of hospital mergers.
Next, Part I.D explores courts’ analyses of merger challenges brought by the
FTC. Finally, Part I.E presents new evidence that certain hospital mergers
may result in higher prices because the merged parties have greater
bargaining power.
A. The Antitrust Laws Preserve Competition to Protect Consumers
Three laws form the foundation of past and present antitrust
enforcement22: the Sherman Act,23 the Clayton Act,24 and the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTC Act).25 The Sherman Act, enacted in 1890, was the
first of these laws.26 In the years preceding its enactment, the Industrial
Revolution had caused drastic changes to the nature of business and
competition.27
The dominant economic theory of the time was laissez-faire capitalism,
whereby the government did not intervene or attempt to regulate businesses’
operations.28 Many believed, and some still believe, that laissez-faire
capitalism benefits society by enabling those with the most skill to advance
to the top of their fields and share the best products and services in the
marketplace.29 In application, this policy allowed trusts30 to gain control of
certain industries, most notably railroads, oil, steel, and sugar.31 Because
22. Arjun Mishra, History of Antitrust Laws, JURIST (Dec. 30, 2013, 8:53 PM),
http://www.jurist.org/feature/2013/12/a-history-and-the-main-acts.php
[https://perma.cc/FS6Y-YGDD].
23. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).
24. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2012).
25. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012).
26. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1–7).
27. See NORMAN WARE, WEALTH AND WELFARE: THE BACKGROUNDS OF AMERICAN
ECONOMICS 103–05 (1949).
28. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE REINS OF POWER: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 140, 143 (1963).
29. Id. at 143.
30. The trust was an organization of business competitors that delegated authority to a
trustee to make decisions about industry-wide pricing and output. ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL.,
ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY
103 (3d ed. 2017). During the Industrial Revolution, all monopolies were colloquially referred
to as trusts. Prather S. McDonald, A Colloquial upon the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, 1 TENN. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1923). For a discussion of the economic conditions that affected the formation of
trusts, see Wayne D. Collins, Trusts and the Origins of Antitrust Legislation, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2279, 2292–334 (2013).
31. FTC Fact Sheet: Antitrust Laws: A Brief History, FED. TRADE COMMISSION 1,
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/games/off-site/youarehere/pages/pdf/FTC-
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these industries centralized supply and set prices, prices drastically increased
and businesses were not incentivized to offer quality products.32
Many Americans, dissatisfied with decreased quality and increased prices,
called upon the government to regulate the trusts.33 In response, Congress
passed the Sherman Act, which states that “[e]very person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony.”34
The Sherman Act was a “paper tiger” for the first twelve years of its life.35
Courts continuously ruled in favor of businesses and found no violations of
the Sherman Act.36 For instance, in United States v. E.C. Knight Co.,37 the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the defendants’ monopoly in the manufacturing
of refined sugar was not illegal under the Sherman Act because the business
did not constitute commerce and only commerce could be regulated by the
Sherman Act.38 In so holding, the Court found a loophole to the antitrust law
and allowed the monopoly to remain.39
Despite prosecutorial setbacks such as this, President Theodore Roosevelt
continued to encourage the DOJ to bring suits against monopolies under the
Sherman Act.40 In the landmark case Northern Securities Co. v. United
States,41 the Court held for the first time that the combination into a trust of
several railroads was a violation of the Sherman Act and mandated the
monopoly’s dissolution.42
After Northern Securities, businesses discovered that they could continue
to control prices and production by lawfully merging instead of forming
trusts.43 The resulting increase in mergers and the limited ability of the
Sherman Act to block them sparked the adoption of the Clayton and FTC
Acts in 1914.44 Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits a merger if “the effect
of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
Competition_Antitrust-Laws.pdf [https://perma.cc/43Y7-ZTUL] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018);
see also LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, BUSINESS—A PROFESSION 208–21 (1933); McDonald, supra
note 30, at 1.
32. See BRANDEIS, supra note 31, at 212; Dow Votaw, Antitrust in 1914: The Climate of
Opinion, 24 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. 14, 16–17 (1964).
33. Jonida Lamaj, The Evolution of Antitrust Law in USA, 13 EUR. SCI. J. 154, 161 (2017).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
35. The Trust Buster, U.S. HIST., http://www.ushistory.org/us/43b.asp [https://perma.cc/
2ERU-LM2Y] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018); see also Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism,
96 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 16 (2008).
36. See Crane, supra note 35, at 16 (“[T]he Act was rarely used and, when it was, its axe
most often fell on labor rather than capital.”).
37. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
38. Id. at 12.
39. See id.
40. See Crane, supra note 35, at 17–18; Votaw, supra note 32, at 19.
41. 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
42. Id. at 357–60.
43. See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS
117 (1955) (noting the “limitations of . . . the Sherman Act in curbing mergers”).
44. See Votaw, supra note 32, at 19–20, 27.
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create a monopoly.”45 Additionally, to help the DOJ in enforcing the antitrust
laws, Congress passed the FTC Act, which created the FTC, an independent
federal agency.46 The FTC Act gave the FTC the power to take action against
parties engaging in “unfair methods of competition . . . and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”47
About sixty years later, Congress passed another important antitrust law:
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (“HSR Act”).48
The HSR Act requires parties to large mergers49 to give the DOJ and FTC
advance notice of the proposed mergers.50 In effect, the HSR Act solidified
the agencies’ ability to prospectively review mergers and stop
anticompetitive mergers at the outset.51
Today, the overarching purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect
competition within the marketplace.52 The idea behind this goal is that free
and open competition benefits consumers by incentivizing businesses to offer
lower-priced and higher-quality goods or services to attract customers.53
This ideology is not so different from the laissez-faire view from the
nineteenth century.54 However, the antitrust laws enable the government to
ensure the marketplace remains competitive, which protects consumers from
higher prices and other harmful effects.55
B. The FTC and DOJ Review Proposed Mergers
The FTC and DOJ are responsible for investigating potentially
anticompetitive mergers.56 The agencies seek to determine whether a merged
firm will be able to increase prices or reduce quality postmerger due to
increased market power.57 This Part discusses the regulatory investigation
process to which most mergers are subject.

45. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2012).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
48. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act (HSR Act) of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
49. The HSR Act only requires that mergers of a certain value be reported to the DOJ and
FTC. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2012). The threshold amount is adjusted each year. In 2017, parties
were required to submit an HSR premerger notification filing (HSR filing), so named for the
HSR Act, for mergers valued in excess of $80.8 million. See Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds
for Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 8524, 8524 (Jan. 26, 2017).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 18a.
51. Id.; Milestones in FTC History: HSR Act Launches Effective Premerger Review, FED.
TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-matters/2015/03/
milestones-ftc-history-hsr-act-launches-effective [https://perma.cc/8E5A-ZNDF] (last visited
Mar. 15, 2018).
52. FTC Fact Sheet, supra note 31, at 1; Antitrust Enforcement and the Consumer, U.S.
DEP’T JUST. 1 (Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/800691/download
[https://perma.cc/27F3-7TY6].
53. Antitrust Enforcement and the Consumer, supra note 52, at 1.
54. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
55. Antitrust Enforcement and the Consumer, supra note 52, at 1–2.
56. Id. at 3; FTC Fact Sheet, supra note 31, at 2.
57. Lopatka, supra note 10, at 824.
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If a transaction meets the size requirements prescribed by the HSR Act,58
the merging parties must inform the DOJ and FTC of their intent to merge
before the merger is consummated.59 Parties do so by submitting premerger
filings, often referred to as HSR filings, to the agencies in accordance with
the HSR Act.60 The HSR filings provide the agencies with key information
about the proposed merger, the merging parties’ businesses, and the industry
or industries that the merger will affect.61
Although merging parties submit HSR filings to both the FTC and DOJ,
only one agency62 reviews the proposed transaction.63 The agency
responsible for reviewing the merger is usually designated based upon the
agencies’ expertise in different industries.64 For instance, the FTC usually
reviews mergers between health-care providers, such as hospitals65 and
physician groups,66 while the DOJ usually reviews mergers between health
insurance providers (“payers”).67
After submitting their HSR filings, parties must wait for agency clearance
before consummating the merger.68 The reviewing agency initially has thirty
days to complete its preliminary review.69 Based on its findings, the
reviewing agency may either (1) allow the parties to merge by granting early
termination of the thirty-day waiting period, (2) allow the merger by letting
the thirty-day waiting period expire without taking further action, or
(3) extend the review period by issuing a request for more information,
58. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
59. Premerger Notification Program, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/
enforcement/premerger-notification-program [https://perma.cc/GJE2-67FN] (last visited Mar.
15, 2018).
60. Id.; see also supra note 49 and accompanying text.
61. What Is the Premerger Notification Program?: An Overview, FED. TRADE
COMMISSION 1 (2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/premergerintroductory-guides/guide1.pdf [https://perma.cc/923Q-EY4D]; see also Premerger
Notification Program, supra note 59.
62. State Attorneys General may also review transactions and enforce state and federal
antitrust laws. HSR Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15c (2012); Richard A. Posner, Federalism and the
Enforcement of Antitrust Laws by State Attorneys General, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 8
(2004). This Note focuses on antitrust enforcement by the federal agencies.
63. Premerger Notification and the Merger Review Process, FED. TRADE COMMISSION,
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrustlaws/mergers/premerger-notification-merger-review [https://perma.cc/5RFE-T6EY] (last
visited Mar. 15, 2018).
64. Michael G. Egge & Jason D. Cruise, Practical Guide to the U.S. Merger Review
Process, CONCURRENCES, Feb. 2014, at 1, 3; Bill Baer, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to European Competition Forum 2014, Public and
Private Antitrust Enforcement in the United States 5 (Feb. 11, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/517756/download [https://perma.cc/7WEA-7BW8].
65. See generally, e.g., FTC v. Advocate Health Care Network, 841 F.3d 460 (7th Cir.
2016); FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327 (3d Cir. 2016).
66. See generally, e.g., FTC v. Sanford Health, No. 1:17-cv-00133 (D.N.D. Dec. 15,
2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-3783 (8th Cir. Dec. 26, 2017).
67. See generally, e.g., United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2017);
United States v. Aetna Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2017).
68. Merger Review, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/mediaresources/mergers-and-competition/merger-review [https://perma.cc/38WV-8GME] (last
visited Mar. 15, 2018).
69. Egge & Cruise, supra note 64, at 3.
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known as a “Second Request.”70 Agencies typically issue a Second Request
when the initial review identifies potential anticompetitive concerns and the
agencies need more information to confirm or allay the concerns.71 A Second
Request allows the agency to further investigate the merger’s likely effects
on competition.72
After the agency completes its Second Request investigation, the agency
will either allow the merger to be consummated, approve a modified merger
plan, or attempt to block the merger by suing in federal court and/or initiating
an FTC administrative proceeding.73 Most transactions are approved in
original or modified form.74 The agencies challenge very few in court or
FTC administrative proceedings.75
The process for challenging a merger beyond the investigation period
differs based on which agency has reviewed the transaction.76 For instance,
the DOJ will typically seek a permanent injunction in federal court,77 whereas
the FTC will typically seek a preliminary injunction in federal court to enjoin
the merger until the matter can be decided by the FTC’s administrative

70. Premerger Notification and the Merger Review Process, supra note 63. A buyer can
also withdraw its HSR filing one time and refile within two business days without repaying
the filing fee. FTC Withdraw and Refile Notification, 16 C.F.R. § 803.12 (2018). This gives
the parties more time to work through issues with the FTC or DOJ and may allow the parties
to avoid a time-consuming and costly Second Request. See Premerger Notification Office
Staff, Getting in Sync with HSR Timing Considerations, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Aug. 31,
2017, 8:57 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-matters/2017/08/
getting-sync-hsr-timing-considerations [https://perma.cc/57VW-FQQ8].
71. Premerger Notification and the Merger Review Process, supra note 63.
72. Merger Review, supra note 68.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See William McConnell, Obama Administration Most Aggressive Ever in Regulating
Mergers
and
Acquisitions,
THESTREET
(Apr.
28,
2016,
11:27
AM),
https://www.thestreet.com/story/13538758/1/big-government-steps-up-challenges-to-bigbusiness-in-merger-wars.html [https://perma.cc/F49J-BVJY] (stating that, although the
number of mergers challenged since the Reagan administration has increased, the percentage
of transactions challenged by the DOJ and FTC peaked at fewer than 5 percent between 1981
and 2015). In 2015, there were 1754 merger transactions reported to the agencies.
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, TRENDS IN MERGER INVESTIGATIONS AND ENFORCEMENT AT THE
U.S. ANTITRUST AGENCIES:
FISCAL YEARS 2006–2015, at 3 (2d ed. 2016),
https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Trends-in-Merger-Investigations-andEnforcement-2006-2015 [https://perma.cc/EZS4-Q2YF].
Only forty-two of these
transactions, or approximately 2 percent, were challenged. Id. at 12.
76. Shepard Goldfein & James A. Keyte, Merger Review at FTC and Department of
Justice, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 9, 2014, at 1, 1 (“[The agencies] sue[] to enjoin mergers under different
statutes: the FTC under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act and Justice Department under Section
15 of the Clayton Act.”). As of this writing, a proposed bill—the Standard Merger and
Acquisition Reviews Through Equal Rules (SMARTER) Act—seeks to eliminate the
differences in challenges brought by the FTC and DOJ. Standard Merger and Acquisition
Reviews Through Equal Rules Act of 2017, H.R. 659, 115th Cong.; see also Daniel A.
Friedman & Melissa R. Ginsberg, “SMARTER” Act Advances in Congress: Will It Become
Law?, PATTERSON BELKNAP (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.pbwt.com/antitrust-updateblog/smarter-act-advances-in-congress-will-it-become-law [https://perma.cc/GEU5-9MXM].
77. Goldfein & Keyte, supra note 76, at 1 (noting that the DOJ often consolidates its
claims for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
65(a)(2)).
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court.78 Despite this difference, a court’s decision on a preliminary
injunction challenge brought by the FTC is often the final ruling.79 Losing
parties typically abandon the deal before proceeding to the FTC hearing.80
Similarly, upon defeat, the FTC will likely abandon its challenge.81
C. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines Explain
the Agencies’ Merger Review
The agencies have identified two types of mergers that are likely to
substantially lessen competition or lead to monopolies: vertical mergers and
horizontal mergers.82 A vertical merger is one between businesses at
different levels within an industry.83 For instance, a merger between a
supplier of goods and the retailer who sells the goods would be a vertical
merger. The agencies define horizontal mergers as “mergers and acquisitions
involving actual or potential competitors.”84 A merger between two
competing retailers would be a horizontal merger.
The FTC and DOJ have jointly published two sets of guidelines, which
help practitioners and the business community understand the agencies’
processes for reviewing mergers: the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines and
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.85 Lawyers seeking to defend vertical
mergers may turn to the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, issued in 1984,
to understand the theories under which an agency may challenge a
nonhorizontal merger.86 However, this set of guidelines is not very useful

78. Id. at 2.
79. Id.
80. Id.; see also Respondents’ Memorandum Addressing the Propriety of Proceeding with
the Part 3 Trial When Respondents Cannot Yet Close the Transaction at 11 n.2, In re Cabell
Huntington Hosp., Inc., No. 9366 (FTC dismissed July 6, 2016) (“[T]he pending injunction
hearing in the federal court . . . generally hangs like a Sword of Damocles over [the FTC
administrative] proceeding.”).
81. Goldfein & Keyte, supra note 76, at 2.
82. The FTC’s website actually identifies three types of mergers that are likely to be
anticompetitive: vertical mergers, horizontal mergers, and “potential competition mergers.”
Competitive Effects, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competitionguidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers/competitive-effects
[https://perma.cc/7G9Q-2C8S]
(last visited Mar. 15, 2018). Prior to 2010, a horizontal merger involved the combination of
two actual competitors and a potential competition merger involved the combination of two
potential competitors. See id. In 2010, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines were updated to
combine the latter two categories of mergers. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra
note 12, § 1. Horizontal mergers are now defined in the Guidelines as “mergers and
acquisitions involving actual or potential competitors.” See id.
83. Steven C. Salop & Daniel P. Culley, Potential Competitive Effects of Vertical
Mergers: A How-To Guide for Practitioners 4 (Dec. 8, 2014) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2522179 [https://perma.cc/FLG9-GYVF].
84. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, § 1.
85. See generally HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12; U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, NON-HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1984) [hereinafter NON-HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES].
86. See generally NON-HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 85.
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today because the agencies apply theories of competitive effect that are not
included in the Guidelines.87
Luckily for practitioners seeking to defend a merger between two healthcare providers, a different set of guidelines is available. Most hospital
mergers evaluated by the FTC are horizontal mergers.88 As such, the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines describe the evidence and analytic tools the
agencies utilize to determine whether a merger will violate the federal
antitrust laws.89 The Guidelines were most recently updated in 2010 to more
accurately describe the agencies’ practices and are a helpful tool for the
business community and private antitrust practitioners.90
Most mergers are brought to the agencies’ attention through an HSR filing
before they are consummated.91 One difficulty agencies face in reviewing
unconsummated mergers is uncertainty.92 The agencies cannot be sure
whether anticompetitive effects will, in fact, result.93 Because of this, the
agencies review an array of evidence to make an informed prediction.94
Part I.C.1 of this Note discusses how the agencies define the relevant
market in which merging parties compete. Part I.C.2 explains how the
agencies evaluate postmerger market share and changes to market
concentration. Part I.C.3 then discusses the defenses that merging parties
may assert.
1. The Relevant Market
To predict a proposed merger’s likely impact on competition, the agencies
must first define the market.95 A market is defined by how and where the
merging parties compete.96 For instance, hospitals may compete in the

87. Jon Sallet, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. for Litig., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks
as Prepared for Delivery to ABA Fall Forum: The Interesting Case of the Vertical Merger 1
(Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/938236/download [https://perma.cc/
MU83-5RW4].
88. Joe Cantlupe, New Scrutiny for Hospital Mergers, NEJM CATALYST (Nov. 29, 2016),
https://catalyst.nejm.org/scrutiny-hospital-cross-market-mergers/ [https://perma.cc/X6HMR5C2].
89. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, § 1.
90. Christine A. Varney, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Evolution, Not
Revolution, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 651, 651 (2011).
91. In 2013, 1326 transactions were reported and reviewed under the HSR Act and thirtyeight transactions were reviewed after the FTC or DOJ initiated independent action. Merger
Review by the Numbers, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/blogs/competition-matters/2014/05/merger-review-numbers [https://perma.cc/34N3F6RF] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).
92. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, § 1.
93. Id.
94. Id. § 2.2.
95. Id. § 4.
96. Id. The Supreme Court stated that “[t]he ‘area of effective competition’ must be
determined by reference to a product market (the ‘line of commerce’) and a geographic market
(the ‘section of the country’).” Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962).

2484

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

relevant product market by offering similar services.97 Hospitals may
compete in the relevant geographic market by offering health care to
individuals in the same region or community.98 According to the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, market definition is centered on “customers’ ability and
willingness to substitute away from one product to another in response to a
price increase or a corresponding non-price change such as a reduction in
product quality or service.”99 In the hospital context, the product and
geographic markets are likely to intersect because the agencies want to
determine whether patients will be able to receive comparable services and
specialties without traveling far from home.100
The agencies define the geographic and product markets by employing the
“hypothetical monopolist test.”101 The test seeks to determine the smallest
area in which a hypothetical monopolist could profitably impose a “small but
significant and non-transitory increase in price” (SSNIP) for a given product
or service.102 The geographic market consists of all hospitals where patients
would be willing to seek care in response to a SSNIP at their preferred
hospital.103 The agencies’ goal is to identify hospitals that are reasonably
interchangeable with one of the merging hospitals.104
2. Market Share and Concentration
Once the hypothetical monopolist test defines the relevant market, the
agencies can evaluate the merging parties’ market share and the effect of the
merger on market concentration.105 The agencies seek to analyze market
shares and concentration in a narrowly defined market under the hypothetical
monopolist test because a narrow market best allows the agencies to assess
whether the proposed merger will likely substantially lessen competition.106
A hospital’s market share is defined by its percentage of patient discharges
in the relevant market.107 The market shares of all the hospitals in the

97. See, e.g., FTC v. Advocate Health Care Network, 841 F.3d 460, 468 (7th Cir. 2016)
(“[T]he parties here agree that the product market here is . . . inpatient general acute care
services—specifically, those services sold to commercial health plans and their members.”).
98. See, e.g., id. at 470 (noting that “because most patients prefer to go to nearby hospitals,
there are often only a few hospitals in a geographic market”).
99. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, § 4.
100. See Amy D. Paul, The Complexities of Hospital Merger Review, A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_ser
ies/complexities_of_hospital_merger_review.html [https://perma.cc/A2GE-LQDL] (last
visited Mar. 15, 2018).
101. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, § 4.1.1.
102. Id.; see also Lopatka, supra note 10, at 825.
103. Lopatka, supra note 10, at 825.
104. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, § 4.1.1.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. H.E. Frech III, James Langenfeld & R. Forrest McCluer, Elzinga-Hogarty Tests and
Alternative Approaches for Market Share Calculations in Hospital Markets, 71 ANTITRUST
L.J. 921, 935 (2004); see also James B. Albertson, Note, Hospital Antitrust: The Merging
Hospital and the Resulting Exposure to Antitrust Merger and Monopolization Laws, 24
WASHBURN L.J. 300, 319 (1985).
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relevant market are then used to determine whether the market is highly
concentrated, moderately concentrated, or not concentrated.108
Market concentration is calculated by summing the squares of each
hospital’s market share.109 This figure is known as the HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI).110 For instance, if there are four hospitals in the
relevant market, each with a 25 percent market share, then the calculation is
252 + 252 + 252 + 252 = 2500.111 The HHI is first calculated using the
hospitals’ market shares before the merger takes place and then again using
the prospective market shares of the same hospitals postmerger.112 If two of
the hospitals in the previous example merged, the postmerger calculation
would be 502 + 252 + 252 = 3750. The effect of the merger on market
concentration is determined by comparing pre- and post-merger HHIs.113
The greater the increase in HHI will be postmerger, the greater the agencies’
antitrust concerns will be.114
The determination of the geographic market is extremely important
because the merging parties’ postmerger market share, and thus market
concentration, will be higher in a narrowly defined geographic market. The
agencies presume that mergers that significantly increase market
concentration or result in a highly concentrated market increase the merging
parties’ market power.115 The agencies seek to block these mergers because
they presume that increased market power will lead to higher prices, reduced
product quality and variety, reduced service, and diminished innovation.116
3. Defenses
Once the agencies have determined that a merger will likely be
anticompetitive, the parties may argue that the transaction should be allowed
because competition will not be adversely affected, or that other benefits may
result.117 The Horizontal Merger Guidelines identify several defenses that
the agencies are likely to find persuasive.118 According to the Guidelines,
the agencies will recognize the failing-firm defense when one of the parties
is in imminent danger of failing, such that
108. Lopatka, supra note 10, at 826.
109. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, § 5.3.
110. Id. An HHI below 1500 suggests that the market is not concentrated, while an HHI
between 1500 and 2500 suggests that the market is moderately concentrated. Id. An HHI
above 2500 suggests the market is highly concentrated. Id.
111. See id. § 5.3 n.9.
112. Id. § 5.3.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. § 2.1.3. An increase of more than 200 “will be presumed to be likely to enhance
market power.” Id. § 5.3.
116. Id. § 1. Increased market power is presumed to be anticompetitive because price is
dependent upon supply and demand. See Price Maker, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/pricemaker.asp [https://perma.cc/EN9Y-A3TK] (last
visited Mar. 15, 2018). With fewer competitors, companies have greater “control over the
supply released into the market, allowing [them] to dictate prices.” Id.
117. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, § 2.1.3.
118. See id. §§ 8–11.
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(1) the allegedly failing firm would be unable to meet its financial
obligations in the near future;
(2) it would not be able to reorganize successfully under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Act; and
(3) it has made unsuccessful good-faith efforts to elicit reasonable
alternative offers that would keep its tangible and intangible assets in the
relevant market and pose a less severe danger to competition than does the
proposed merger.119

The failing-firm defense may be successful when the parties can show the
merger will not likely enhance market power because the assets of the failing
firm will likely exit the relevant market absent a merger, which would ensure
that consumers will not be harmed by the merger.120
The existence of powerful buyers in the market may also weigh in favor of
a merger.121 Although the presence of a powerful buyer does not eliminate
anticompetitive effects, parties may argue that the buyer will be able to
constrain prices following the merger.122 For instance, in FTC v. Sanford
Health,123 the merging physician groups argued that Blue Cross Blue Shield
of North Dakota was a powerful buyer and its presence in the market would
limit their ability to raise prices postmerger.124
Additionally, merging parties may argue that barriers to entry are low, such
that the merger will not harm competition because increased prices will lead
new firms to enter the market and entice consumers.125 In analyzing barrierto-entry claims, the agencies consider historical evidence of entry in the
relevant market.126 According to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, parties
may pose a successful defense “if entry would be timely, likely, and sufficient
in its magnitude, character, and scope to deter or counteract the competitive
effects of concern.”127
Merging parties can also argue that the merger will create efficiencies that
will allow the merged firm to better compete, possibly resulting in lower
prices, improved quality, or new products.128 There are several requirements
that efficiency arguments must meet to be cognizable to the agencies.129
Efficiencies must be merger-specific, verifiable, and must not arise from
anticompetitive reductions in output or service.130 Merging parties must
show the likelihood that each efficiency asserted will result, how and when
each will be achieved, any costs associated with achieving the efficiencies,
119. Id. § 11.
120. Id.
121. Id. § 8.
122. Id.
123. No. 1:17-cv-00133, slip op. at 1 (D.N.D. Dec. 15, 2017), appeal docketed, No. 173783 (8th Cir. Dec. 26, 2017).
124. Id. at 35–41.
125. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, § 9.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. § 10.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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and how the efficiencies will enable the merged firm to compete more
effectively.131 It may be difficult for merging parties to prove that beneficial
efficiencies will result because there is no definitive proof of what will occur
once the merger is consummated.132 Further, even if the merging parties can
show that efficiencies will result, the agencies have the discretion to
determine whether the efficiencies outweigh the potential harm.133
D. Courts Follow the Horizontal Merger Guidelines
If the agencies determine, upon weighing all the evidence, that a
transaction will likely substantially lessen competition, they may seek to
enjoin the merger.134 Courts apply different standards to mergers challenged
by the FTC and DOJ because the agencies sue to enjoin mergers under
different statutes.135
Although it may seem that the burden of proof would be the same
regardless of the agency bringing the suit, this is not true. The FTC enjoys a
lower burden of proof than is normally required in a preliminary-injunction
hearing.136 The FTC Act provides that a preliminary injunction should be
granted when the FTC has shown that upon “weighing the equities and
considering the Commission’s likelihood of ultimate success, [a preliminary
injunction] would be in the public interest.”137 Courts have interpreted this
statutory language as placing a lower burden of proof on the FTC because
the statute uses a public interest standard, instead of the traditional equity
standard.138 Courts give great deference to the FTC in preliminary-injunction
hearings because, in conducting this balancing test, merging parties’ interests
are not given much weight and often cannot outweigh the public interest in
enforcing the antitrust laws.139
The FTC initially has the burden of proving that a transaction will be
anticompetitive.140 The FTC can meet its burden by proposing relevant
geographic and product markets and showing that the merger will likely have

131. Id.
132. Id.; see also Dennis A. Yao & Thomas N. Dahdough, Information Problems in Merger
Decision Making and Their Impact on Development of an Efficiencies Defense, 62 ANTITRUST
L.J. 23, 28–30 (1993).
133. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, § 10. (“The greater the potential
adverse competitive effect of a merger, the greater must be the cognizable efficiencies, and
the more they must be passed through to customers . . . .”); D. Daniel Sokol & James A.
Fishkin, Antitrust Merger Efficiencies in the Shadow of the Law, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC
45, 56–57 (2011).
134. See supra Part I.B.
135. Goldfein & Keyte, supra note 76, at 1.
136. Id.
137. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2012).
138. FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing FTC v.
Exxon Corp., 636 F.2d 1336, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). Unlike plaintiffs under the traditional
equity standard, the FTC does not need to show a likelihood of irreparable harm or that private
equities are subordinated to public equities. Id. at 1060 n.7.
139. See FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 352 (3d Cir. 2016).
140. Id. at 337 (citing Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.–Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys.,
Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 783 (9th Cir. 2015)).
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anticompetitive effects within those markets.141 The relevant market should
be defined in accordance with the hypothetical monopolist test.142 Once the
relevant market is defined, the court will infer that a transaction will likely
be anticompetitive if it will significantly increase market concentration or the
merged firm’s market share.143
Once the FTC has met its burden of proof, the burden shifts to the merging
parties to rebut a presumption of anticompetitive effects.144 There are a few
defenses that merging hospitals may employ to rebut a presumption of
anticompetitive effects.145 Parties might argue that the FTC’s market is not
well defined and that the market shares being considered are inaccurate
because the relevant market is actually larger and has more competitors.146
Parties can also argue that one of the defenses described in the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines applies.147 Specifically, parties might argue that the
transaction will create efficiencies,148 the benefits of which outweigh any
potential harm to competition.149
Courts view the efficiency defense with skepticism.150 It has not been
formally endorsed by most courts, including the Supreme Court, and the
governing statute does not prescribe it.151 Thus, when courts analyze the
sufficiency of efficiency claims, they often impose a very strict standard of
proof.152
141. Id. at 337–38; FTC v. Advocate Health Care Network, 841 F.3d 460, 464, 467 (7th
Cir. 2016).
142. Advocate Health, 841 F.3d at 464; Penn State Hershey, 838 F.3d at 338; St. Luke’s
Health, 778 F.3d at 784.
143. Penn State Hershey, 838 F.3d at 347 (finding that an increase in HHI over 200 and the
merged parties’ likely high market share postmerger were sufficient to find the merger
presumptively anticompetitive); ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. FTC, 749 F.3d 559, 570 (6th
Cir. 2014) (finding that the “strong correlation between market share and price, and the degree
to which th[e] merger would further concentrate markets that are already highly
concentrated . . . fully supports the Commission’s application of a presumption of illegality”).
144. Penn State Hershey, 838 F.3d at 337 (citing St. Luke’s Health, 778 F.3d at 783).
145. Matthew L. Cantor, Defending Hospital Mergers: 4 Antitrust Defenses, BECKER’S
HOSP. REV. (Nov. 13, 2013), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-transactionsand-valuation/defending-hospital-mergers-4-antitrust-defenses.html [https://perma.cc/5TRFWUDM].
146. Id.
147. See supra Part I.C.
148. This Note focuses on the efficiency defense.
149. Cantor, supra note 145; see also HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12,
§ 10.
150. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967) (“Possible economies cannot
be used as a defense to illegality.”); United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371
(1963) (finding that an anticompetitive merger cannot be saved because it may result in social
or economic benefits); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344–45 (1962); FTC
v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 347–48 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that a hospital
merger that would allow the parties to better utilize their capacity did not justify allowing the
presumptively anticompetitive transaction to be consummated); Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.–
Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 788–92 (9th Cir. 2015).
151. Penn State Hershey, 838 F.3d at 348 (“Based on [the Supreme Court’s] language and
on the Clayton Act’s silence on the issue, we are skeptical that such an efficiencies defense
even exists.”).
152. Id. at 349 (citing St. Luke’s Health, 778 F.3d at 790; FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938
F.2d 1206, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991)). It is difficult to know what standard of proof the agencies
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No merging parties have yet prevailed before a circuit court by proving
efficiencies sufficient to rebut a presumption of anticompetitive effects.153
Yet most circuit courts have adopted at least some of the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines’ requirements for successfully proving efficiencies. In 2016, the
Third Circuit adopted four requirements from the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines: merging parties must show that efficiencies (1) will “offset the
anticompetitive concerns in highly concentrated markets,” (2) are “merger
specific,” (3) are “verifiable, not speculative,” and (4) “must not arise from
anticompetitive reductions in output or service.”154 The Eleventh Circuit
recognizes the last three requirements but only credits arguments for pricerelated efficiencies.155 The D.C. Circuit requires that merging parties prove
“extraordinary efficiencies” that are merger-specific.156
E. Cross-Market Mergers May Increase
Hospitals’ Bargaining Power
The FTC and courts have not yet considered the effects of cross-market
mergers—mergers between firms that compete in different markets—in their
analyses of horizontal hospital mergers.157 This Part explains how crossmarket give some hospitals increased bargaining power for some hospitals.
Because of the unique way that hospitals must market their products to health
insurers (i.e., payers), cross-market merged hospitals enjoy greater
competitive strength, despite potentially occupying a smaller share of the
market.
To date, the FTC has not sought to enjoin a cross-market health-care
merger: a merger between two hospitals that offer services to patients in
separate and distinct markets.158 This may be because it is assumed that
parties do not have increased bargaining power unless there is less
actually require because their investigations remain confidential. Mergers, FED. TRADE
COMMISSION,
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/
mergers [https://perma.cc/Z93U-E7B6] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).
153. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
154. Penn State Hershey, 838 F.3d at 348–49.
155. St. Luke’s Health, 778 F.3d at 791–92 (“[T]he district court concluded that St. Luke’s
might provide better service to patients after the merger. That is a laudable goal, but the
Clayton Act does not excuse mergers that lessen competition or create monopolies simply
because the merged entity can improve its operations.”); Roger D. Blair, Christine Piette
Durrance & D. Daniel Sokol, Hospital Mergers and Economic Efficiency, 91 WASH. L. REV.
1, 54–55 (2016).
156. FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing Univ. Health, 938
F.2d at 1223).
157. David A. Argue & Lona Fowdur, An Examination of New Theories on Price Effects
of
Cross-Market
Hospital
Mergers
6
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c909/cc1194b13cda18059ec26d85a2c4f1623b00.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M6M5-Y2TT] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).
158. See Leemore Dafny, Kate Ho & Robin S. Lee, The Price Effects of Cross-Market
Hospital Mergers 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22106, 2017). As
of this writing, the DOJ has challenged the cross-market merger of Time Warner and AT&T,
possibly marking a change in the agencies’ policy toward cross-market mergers. Cecilia Kang
& Michael J. de la Merced, U.S. Sues to Stop AT&T’s Takeover of Time Warner, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 21, 2017, at A1.
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competition in the market.159 Additionally, the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines and the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines both fail to explain to
practitioners or agency staff how to evaluate these types of mergers.160
As previously discussed, agencies and courts are willing to assume that a
transaction will have anticompetitive effects if the merger increases market
concentration or the merged firm’s market share.161 This is likely because
historical evidence shows that mergers that increase market concentration
and the merged firm’s market share cause higher prices due to increased
bargaining power.162 Moreover, evidence suggests that cross-market
hospital mergers lead to increased prices due to increased bargaining power.
Economists have recently begun to analyze price increases resulting from
cross-market mergers to understand how and why this may be occurring.
This Part discusses three models that have been used to analyze cross-market
price increases and economists’ theories as to why price increases occur. Part
I.E.1 explains the employer-choice model. Part I.E.2 then describes the
common-customers model. Finally, Part I.E.3 explains the health-planpricing model.
1. The Employer-Choice Model
Gregory Vistnes and Yanis Sarafidis were two of the first economists to
study cross-market mergers and the effect they may have on prices.163
Because health-care providers must compete for both patients and inclusion
in payers’ health plans,164 Vistnes and Sarafidis suggest that even if patients
do not view two hospitals as substitutes for one another, anticompetitive
effects may still occur if payers view the hospitals as substitutes.165
Payers compete on two levels.166 First, because most Americans receive
health insurance through their employer or a family member’s employer,
payers must compete to have employers offer their health plans to
employees.167 Second, payers compete to be chosen by employees who are
offered a choice of more than one health plan.168
159. Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 158, at 2.
160. David A. Argue & Scott D. Stein, Cross-Market Health Care Provider Mergers: The
Next Enforcement Frontier, 30 ANTITRUST 25, 25 (2015) (“[T]hey do not raise concerns under
the competitive effects analysis of the [Horizontal Merger] Guidelines because the providers
would not be viewed as substitutes.”).
161. See supra Parts I.C–D.
162. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
163. See Gregory Vistnes & Yanis Sarafidis, Cross-Market Hospital Mergers: A Holistic
Approach, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 253, 258 (2013).
164. Argue & Stein, supra note 160, at 25.
165. Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 163, at 260.
166. Id. at 266; Gregory Vistnes, Hospitals, Mergers, and Two-Stage Competition, 67
ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 673 (2000).
167. Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 163, at 265–66.
168. Most employers seek to offer their employees a single health plan or a choice of two
or more health plans that will be attractive to all of their employees, even though the employees
may live and work in various geographic markets. Id. The number of plans offered to
employees varies with the size of the firm. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH &
EDUC. TR., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2017 ANNUAL SURVEY 66 (2017). In 2017,

2018]

MERGERS AND PATIENT PROTECTION

2491

Payers’ health plans primarily compete based on the health-care providers
from which members can receive care,169 such as hospitals, physicians, and
ancillary care providers.170 Because payers need to include the maximum
number of providers in their network to remain competitive with other
payers, merged firms may enjoy greater bargaining power because the loss
of two hospitals will have a much greater effect on the payer’s ability to
compete than the loss of one hospital.171
Before a merger occurs, if a hospital attempts to increase its price, the
payer can threaten to drop the hospital from its network and steer its members
to another hospital.172 If patients view two hospitals as substitutes for one
another (as identified by the hypothetical monopolist test), then the health
plan will retain power to constrain prices.173 If patients are willing to seek
care from other hospitals in the payer’s network, then the health plan will not
be affected if it fails to contract with one.174
Vistnes and Sarafidis suggest that, because payers seek to sell their plans
to employers whose employees live and work in various geographic markets,
the most attractive health plans are those with the fewest holes in their
network.175 Cross-market mergers allow the merged hospitals to threaten
payers with more holes in the various markets in which the ultimate
customers may live.176 The more holes a plan has, the less likely it is that
employers will choose to offer that health plan to their employees.177 Even
if the employer did offer the health plan, employees may be more likely to
use a different plan that has fewer holes in the geographic market where they
seek care. Because payers depend so heavily on the inclusion of hospitals in
their health plans, hospital systems garner increased bargaining power to
raise rates.178

approximately 71 percent of large employers (with 5000 workers or more) gave their
employees the opportunity to choose from more than one health plan. Id. Smaller employers
were less likely to offer more than one health plan. Id.
169. Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 163, at 267.
170. Ancillary care providers typically offer outpatient specialty services, such as lab
testing and imaging, rehabilitation, and long-term acute care. For a more detailed list of
ancillary care services, see Ancillary Care Categories, ANCILLARY CARE SERVICES,
http://www.anci-care.com/providers-categories.html [https://perma.cc/9MZ3-RYMB] (last
visited Mar. 15, 2018).
171. Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 163, at 257, 268. The authors rely on two underlying
assumptions that are important to recognize: (1) health plans charge the same premium for
each of the employer’s employees, regardless of where they live and (2) health-care providers
contract on “an ‘all-or-nothing’ basis.” Id. at 268, 282.
172. Id. at 269.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 275.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 278–81.
178. Id. at 275.
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2. The Common-Customers Model
In 2016, Leemore Dafny, Kate Ho, and Robin S. Lee published a study
using the common-customers model to demonstrate why prices increase
following cross-market mergers.179 The common-customers model is a
variation of the employer-choice model.180 Under this model, insurers
compete for “customers who in turn may aggregate the preferences of
multiple individuals,” such as employees or households.181 The study shows
that when two merging hospitals are valued by a common customer, price
increases may result.182
Dafny, Ho, and Lee suggest that common customers will generally buy a
bundle of provider services from payers.183 For instance, employers may
seek a bundle of providers in two geographic markets where their employees
reside, and families may seek a bundle of adult and pediatric hospitals.184
The authors suggest that the common customer’s preference for a crossmarket bundle leads to the elimination of a competitor and increased
bargaining power for the hospital system.185
3. The Health-Plan-Pricing Model
Vistnes and Sarafidis hypothesize that another reason prices increase
following cross-market mergers is that payers typically charge the same price
to all of an employer’s employees, regardless of where they live.186 If a payer
offers its health plan to an employer whose employees live in different
geographic markets and the employees have a choice of more than one plan,
the payer must adjust its pricing based on any holes that exist in the
geographic markets where the employees live.187 These price adjustments
must be made after analyzing how the price changes will affect the plan’s
profits in all of its markets, not just those with holes.188
If payers marketed their health plans separately for each market, they
would likely charge less in markets with holes and maintain a competitive
price in markets without them.189 However, because payers charge the same
price to all employees regardless of where they seek care, the payer must set
a compromise price.190 Payers cannot price their plans too low based on the
existing holes or they would lose profits in the markets without holes.191 The

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 158, at 1–2.
Argue & Stein, supra note 160, at 26–27.
Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 158, at 1.
Id.
Id. at 5.
See id.
Argue & Stein, supra note 160, at 27.
Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 163, at 281.
Id. at 282.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 283.
Id.
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compromise price will likely be set between the desired prices for a market
with holes and a market without holes.192
This pricing practice provides cross-market merged hospital systems with
increased bargaining power for two reasons. First, insurers will suffer
incremental losses in profit as the number of holes in their networks
increase.193 Second, the health plan’s profits will decline even in markets
without any holes because of the lowered price across the plan.194
II. SHOULD HEALTH-CARE PROVIDERS’
EFFICIENCY ARGUMENTS BE GIVEN GREATER WEIGHT?
There is much debate over whether the agencies and courts should give
greater weight to efficiency arguments presented by merging health-care
providers.195 On the one hand, mergers may produce efficiencies that benefit
consumers, such as cost savings that can be passed on, clinical
standardization that can improve patient care, and utilization of capacity at
two locations that allows for better management of care.196 On the other
hand, research differs on whether these efficiencies actually occur
postmerger.197
This Part discusses the relevant issues in the debate of whether efficiency
arguments should be given more weight. Part II.A discusses how the
efficiency defense has evolved in the various revisions of the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines. Part II.B then provides arguments in favor of expanding
the efficiency defense. Next, Part II.C discusses arguments against
expanding the efficiency defense. Lastly, Part II.D examines common
efficiency arguments that merging hospitals present in court and the grounds
on which they typically fail.
A. The Efficiency Defense’s Increasing Importance
The agencies first incorporated the efficiency defense in the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines in 1968.198 Contrary to prior decisions by the Supreme
192. Id.
193. Argue & Stein, supra note 160, at 26.
194. Id.; see also Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 163, at 283–85.
195. Herbert Hovenkamp, Appraising Merger Efficiencies, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 703,
704 (2017).
196. NOETHER & MAY, supra note 17, at 4–10.
197. Thomas C. Tsai & Ashish K. Jha, Hospital Consolidation, Competition, and Quality:
Is Bigger Necessarily Better?, 312 JAMA 29, 29–30 (2014). Compare NOETHER & MAY,
supra note 17, at 18 (finding that quality and cost efficiencies occur following hospital
mergers), with Melanie Evans, Merger Indigestion: Big Hospital Mergers Failing to Deliver
Promised Results, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Apr. 23, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/
article/20160423/MAGAZINE/304239980 [https://perma.cc/8RMU-6TKQ] (finding that
some recent hospital mergers did not result in quality and cost efficiencies). Numerous studies
have measured health-care quality following mergers. See Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol,
Quality-Enhancing Merger Efficiencies, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1969, 1991–93 (2015) (arguing
that more robust quality measurements should be utilized in analyses of possible merger
efficiencies).
198. William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of
Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 4 (Aug. 5, 2015),
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Court,199 the Guidelines suggested that exceptional efficiencies could justify
a merger that would normally be subject to challenge.200 However, for years,
the agencies did not give much, if any, credit to efficiency arguments.
In 1982, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines made it easier for the agencies
to show that a merger was likely to be anticompetitive; at the same time, they
made it more difficult for merging parties to prove efficiencies sufficient to
overcome the presumption of anticompetitive effects.201 The Guidelines
lowered the burden of proof in response to concerns about the connection
between concentration and the exercise of market power.202 It became
evident that if a single firm exercised control over the majority of a product’s
supply, that firm would also be able to control the output of such product,
increasing demand and price.203 However, this standard of proof was short
lived.
Due to fears that mergers, which could produce efficiencies that would
enable firms to compete more effectively on a global scale, would be
prohibited under the previous standard, the agencies began to refrain from
blocking some mergers.204 As a result, the agencies updated the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines to reflect a more nuanced approach.205 In 1984, the
agencies recognized that postmerger efficiencies could increase overall
competition and lead to lower prices for consumers.206
Since then, the efficiency defense has become more highly valued, with
the FTC noting that several agency investigations have been resolved in favor
of efficiencies that benefit competition.207 However, even after these
changes, it remains very difficult for merging parties to prevail in court by
proving efficiencies sufficient to outweigh findings of potential
anticompetitive harms.208
B. Why Courts Should Consider Merger Efficiencies
There are several arguments for crediting merging parties’ efficiency
arguments. First, there may be a benefit to consumers and the general public
that outweighs any detriment to competition or price.209 Mergers between
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11254.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7QVK-2LE9].
199. In three early cases, the Court declined to accept the efficiency defense in merger
cases. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967); United States v. Phila. Nat’l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
200. Kolasky & Dick, supra note 198, at 8.
201. Deborah A. Garza, Market Definition, the New Horizontal Merger Guidelines, and the
Long March Away from Structural Presumptions, ANTITRUST SOURCE 2 (Oct. 2010),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Oct10_Garza10_
21f.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2BN-7P5C].
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 3.
205. Id.
206. Blair, Durrance & Sokol, supra note 155, at 54.
207. Ramirez, supra note 20, at 11.
208. See Garza, supra note 201, at 3.
209. Kolasky & Dick, supra note 198, at 13.
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inefficiently small firms may increase competition by creating a more
efficient firm.210 If two firms are unable to compete effectively with larger
players in the market, then allowing the merger may actually increase
competition and lead to lower prices.211 Additionally, efficiencies, which
could increase patient outcomes and the quality of care, may result from
mergers between health-care providers.212 The benefits of increased quality
may outweigh any anticompetitive effects, such as price increases.
Second, the statutory language and legislative history of the antitrust laws
do not suggest that Congress intended for the agencies or courts to disregard
merger efficiencies.213 In fact, the Supreme Court acknowledged in Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States214 that Congress, in amending the Clayton Act, did
not intend for the antitrust laws to block “a merger between two small
companies to enable the combination to compete more effectively with larger
corporations dominating the relevant market.”215 This suggests that
Congress was open to the idea that efficiencies may weigh in favor of a
transaction. The Supreme Court did not ultimately rely on this legislative
history and instead found that Congress favored competition over
efficiencies.216
Third, the conceptualization of efficiency arguments as a defense is a
mischaracterization.217 Efficiency arguments are a defense to a prima facie
showing of anticompetitive effects.218 Yet, efficiencies should nonetheless
be considered an integral part of the determination of whether a merger will
lessen competition in the first place.219 Efficiencies play a crucial role in
competition. They can drive competition because increased quality by one
party will incentivize its competitors to match or exceed that quality.220
C. Why Courts Should Remain Skeptical of Efficiency Arguments
There are also several arguments for why agencies and courts should not
credit merging parties’ efficiency arguments. One reason the presumption of
anticompetitive effects should remain difficult to overcome, especially in the
health-care context, is that price increases can have an outsized effect on

210. Id.
211. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, § 10.
212. NOETHER & MAY, supra note 17, at 4–5.
213. Kolasky & Dick, supra note 198, at 13.
214. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
215. Id. at 319.
216. Id. at 344; Kolasky & Dick, supra note 198, at 5.
217. Kolasky & Dick, supra note 198, at 13.
218. See supra notes 144–49 and accompanying text.
219. Kolasky & Dick, supra note 198, at 13.
220. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978);
Competition in the Healthcare Market, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/competition-guidance/industry-guidance/health-care [https://perma.cc/DZT3-2DFM]
(last visited Mar. 15, 2018) (noting the purpose of the antitrust laws is to incentivize
competition that may improve quality).
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consumers.221 Additionally, unscrambling a consummated health-care
merger that later proves to be harmful is very difficult.222
In 1976, Judge Richard Posner vehemently rejected the idea that courts
should analyze merger efficiencies.223 He argued that presumptively
anticompetitive mergers should only be allowed when there is evidence that
the acquiring or acquired firm effectively lacks the ability to compete.224 In
these instances, market-share and concentration figures would be inaccurate
representations of the competitive landscape for those firms.225 He reasoned
that evaluation of efficiencies by courts would be intractable to deal with in
litigation, estimates of cost savings would be difficult to weigh against the
monopoly costs of the merger, and any expenditures made in the process of
seeking merger approval would likely dissipate any cost savings that could
be achieved.226
Empirical evidence varies as to whether efficiencies actually occur
postmerger.227 Some research suggests that mergers may lead to higher costs
and less efficiency and innovation due to reduced competition.228 Former
FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez, quoting the former director of the FTC
Bureau of Economics, stated that “the cost of an average inpatient stay at a
hospital that faces no competition is almost $1,900 higher than those where
there are at least four competitors, which results in higher premiums that get
passed on to consumers.”229 Other evidence suggests that a hospital system’s
size does not correlate with cost.230 Because there is no clear evidence that
mergers lead to efficiencies, it is difficult to evaluate whether the efficiencies
claimed by merging parties will counteract anticompetitive effects or produce
benefits that offset price increases.
There are several hypotheses for why health-care mergers might fail to
realize efficiencies. First, merged facilities often continue to operate
separately and, thus, fail to benefit from the cost savings of integrating their
administrative services.231 Second, hospital systems fail to implement
system-wide standards.232 Third, cost synergies are not the focus of many

221. See Blair, Durrance & Sokol, supra note 155, at 64.
222. Id.
223. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 112 (1976).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
228. Michael Hiltzik, Mergers in the Healthcare Sector: Why You’ll Pay More, L.A. TIMES
(May 27, 2016, 12:05 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-healthcaremergers-20160527-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/3DZC-TT7J].
229. Edith Ramirez, FTC Chairwoman, Keynote Address at Antitrust in Healthcare
Conference 2–3 (May 12, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_
statements/950143/160519antitrusthealthcarekeynote.pdf [https://perma.cc/8J27-4L8Q].
230. Anil Kaul, K.R. Prabha & Suman Katragadda, Size Should Matter: Five Ways to Help
Healthcare Systems Realize the Benefits of Scale, PWC: STRATEGY& (Mar. 15, 2016),
https://www.strategyand.pwc.com/reports/size-should-matter
[https://perma.cc/QBD37KPE].
231. Id.
232. Id.
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mergers.233 Fourth, executives of the merging firms are often focused on
closing the deal rather than integrating the hospitals.234
D. Hospitals’ Efficiency Arguments Typically
Fail at the Circuit Court Level
One requirement, imposed by the agencies in the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines and adopted by several courts, is that efficiencies must be mergerspecific to rebut a presumption of anticompetitive effects.235 As such, certain
efficiency arguments are likely to fail because the benefits could be obtained
through other means, such as contractual arrangements between the parties
or a third party who is not a competitor.236
Parties often argue that merging will reduce costs by eliminating
duplicative services, such as surplus administrative personnel.237 Since each
separate hospital will have an administrative office that conducts nonclinical
tasks, such as billing, finance, credentialing, and procurement, a merger may
reduce headcount by allowing these offices to be consolidated.238 The
resulting savings could be passed on to patients by investing in new or
improved services or discounts.239 However, these arguments are likely to
fail because the cost savings could be achieved through contractual
arrangements and, therefore, are not merger-specific.240
Parties may also argue that savings will be generated through postmerger
standardization of purchasing medical supplies241 and information
technology (IT) systems.242 Hospitals often participate in at least one group
purchasing organization (GPO), through which they secure discounts on
supplies and equipment.243 However, hospitals will often be able to receive
better deals by negotiating with suppliers directly if they purchase a
substantial volume of goods.244 Because a hospital operating on its own
likely does not require a large quantity of goods, it may be unable to reap the
benefits of direct negotiating or to access the best GPO-provided
discounts.245 A merger may allow parties to negotiate for better rates on
supplies and provide them with the ability to store and distribute supplies

233. Id.
234. Id.
235. FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 348 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Saint
Alphonsus Med. Ctr.–Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 790 (9th Cir.
2015)); HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, § 10; see also supra Part I.D.
236. Oliver & Leibenluft, supra note 7, at 23.
237. Id. at 21.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. NOETHER & MAY, supra note 17, at 4–5.
242. Oliver & Leibenluft, supra note 7, at 21–22.
243. NOETHER & MAY, supra note 17, at 4. See generally Michael A. Lindsay, Antitrust
and Group Purchasing, 23 ANTITRUST 66 (2009) (discussing group purchasing organizations).
244. Lindsay, supra note 243, at 68 (“A buying group’s bargaining position is strongest if
it can commit to delivering a volume of business . . . .”).
245. NOETHER & MAY, supra note 17, at 4.
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more efficiently.246 IT systems for electronic medical records operate in the
same way. Mergers may allow hospital systems to share these expensive
systems, which are likely to generate cost savings that may be passed on.247
Because these cost savings can result from contractual arrangements between
parties, such efficiency arguments typically fail.248
Another requirement that creates difficulties for merging parties is that
efficiencies must be verifiable, not speculative.249 Hospitals may argue that
merging will allow them to share their best practices and clinical protocols,
thereby improving patient care.250 Clinical standardization can, in theory,
similarly reduce costs and produce better quality.251 If physicians are better
able to identify avoidable complications in outlier patients, there may be
improvements in the quality of care and patient outcomes.252 However,
because quality is not a set standard, it is very difficult for parties to prove
that quality improvements will result.253
Hospital mergers may also enable parties to utilize excess capacity at one
hospital and alleviate capacity constraints at another, which allows the
constrained party to avoid a capital expenditure.254 For instance, the
acquiring hospital may not have sufficient capacity to house all of its patients,
especially if it is an academic medical center (AMC) with a strong
reputation.255 At the same time, community medical centers often
underutilize their capacity.256 By combining the two, the community hospital
can take over the care of patients requiring less complex procedures, and the
AMC can focus on high-end services.257 A merger between two such
hospitals may generate capital savings by allowing the AMC to avoid
building new facilities.258 These savings can then be passed on to consumers
through investments in new service lines, equipment, and building
renovations that will allow the hospitals to run more smoothly.259 In
asserting this defense in court, however, parties must prove that the efficiency
will be achieved, is merger-specific, and will not result in an anticompetitive
reduction in output.260
In FTC v. Penn State Hershey Medical Center,261 the parties argued that
the proposed merger would relieve the acquiring hospital’s capacity
246. Id.
247. Oliver & Leibenluft, supra note 7, at 21–22.
248. See id. at 22.
249. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, § 10.
250. Oliver & Leibenluft, supra note 7, at 22.
251. NOETHER & MAY, supra note 17, at 6.
252. Id.
253. Oliver & Leibenluft, supra note 7, at 22.
254. Id. at 21; see also FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 349–50 (3d
Cir. 2016).
255. NOETHER & MAY, supra note 17, at 6.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Oliver & Leibenluft, supra note 7, at 21.
260. Id.; see also supra Part I.D.
261. 838 F.3d 327 (3d Cir. 2016).
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constraints.262 However, the circuit court rejected this argument and found
that the merger would have the anticompetitive effect of making it
unnecessary for one party to build a new bed tower that would increase
output.263 The parties argued that the acquiring hospital, Penn State Hershey
Medical Center (“Hershey”), was overly constrained and struggling to find a
solution to its capacity problems.264 The Hershey board of directors had been
considering a proposal to build a new bed tower, which would cost $277
million.265 However, these plans were not yet finalized or approved by the
board, and they would have taken a long time to implement.266 The hospital
that Hershey sought to acquire, PinnacleHealth System (“Pinnacle”), had
excess capacity.267 The district court found that the merger would create
efficiencies sufficient to rebut any presumption of anticompetitive effects, if
found.268 However, the Third Circuit found that “Hershey’s ability to forego
building the 100-bed tower” would be an anticompetitive reduction in
services that would not justify allowing the merger to occur.269
III. GREATER WEIGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO
HOSPITALS’ POSSIBLE POSTMERGER EFFICIENCIES
This Note proposes that the agencies and courts should give greater weight
to health-care merger efficiencies. The possibility that mergers between
health-care providers may lead to quality improvements that can benefit
patients is worth the risk of increased prices. Although higher prices are
undesirable, the possibility of improved patient outcomes should justify price
increases. Various government agencies have placed monetary values on
human life exceeding $8 million per life.270 Although the FTC has not set a
monetary value on life, assuming the value of life is above $8 million
suggests that certain price increases at merged hospitals may be justified
when there is a reasonable probability that lives will be saved due to merger

262. Id. at 347.
263. Id. at 349–50.
264. FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 185 F. Supp. 3d 552, 559–60 (M.D. Pa. 2016),
rev’d, 838 F.3d 327.
265. Id. at 560.
266. See Heather Stauffer, Expansion Could Increase Hershey Medical Center Capacity by
up
to
Fifteen
Percent,
LANCASTER
ONLINE
(Apr.
21,
2017),
http://lancasteronline.com/news/local/expansion-could-increase-hershey-medical-centercapacity-by-up-to/article_e9d78784-2600-11e7-bd3d-6334729f1421.html
[https://perma.cc/V7FS-XDTC].
267. Penn State Hershey, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 561.
268. Id. at 559–63.
269. FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 349–50 (3d Cir. 2016).
270. Dave Merrill, No One Values Your Life More Than the Federal Government,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-value-of-life/
[https://perma.cc/9KD8-9BWL]. The Department of Agriculture values an individual human
life at $8.9 million, the Food and Drug Administration and Department of Health and Human
Services value life at $9.5 million, and the Environmental Protection Agency values life at $10
million. Id. These values are used by these agencies to determine whether the benefits of
proposed regulations outweigh their costs. Id.
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efficiencies.271 Additionally, when viewed from the perspective of the
consumer, the possibility of saving the life of a family member or neighbor
may be priceless.
Allowing hospitals to merge based on efficiency arguments may increase
the number of lives saved.272 This is a more important goal than reducing
price. Though not all mergers will result in saved lives, it is too difficult to
determine when life-saving efficiencies will be generated.273 The agencies
and courts should be willing to accept efficiency arguments at a lower
standard than is currently present because the possibility that lives will be
saved is a risk worth taking.
The current Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the courts’ interpretation of
the Guidelines present too high a hurdle and likely block mergers that could
have great benefits to patient quality, outcomes, and care.274 Although it is
difficult to know for certain how the agencies are interpreting the
requirements laid out in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines,275 it is possible
to analyze the way that courts view merging parties’ efficiency arguments.276
This Part argues that the burden of proof courts place upon merging healthcare providers to prove efficiencies is too high.277 The Horizontal Merger
Guidelines outline requirements that courts should continue to rely upon.278
However, in doing so, courts should lower the standard for these
requirements and refrain from blocking mergers between hospitals and other
health-care providers where efficiencies may plausibly result. Part III.A
explains how courts should interpret the requirements of the efficiency
defense. Part III.B then proposes a new efficiency argument based on the
effects of cross-market mergers that agencies and courts should consider in
analyzing mergers’ effects on competition.
A. There Should Be a Lower Standard for
Proving Health-Care Merger Efficiencies
Parties who have undergone agency investigations and choose to argue
their case in court likely believe there are compelling reasons that their

271. For instance, if prices increase by $24 million following a merger, this merger may be
justified if at least three lives are saved. Because increased costs are diluted among those
seeking care in the geographic market, each person’s increase in price may contribute to the
merging hospitals’ abilities to save lives.
272. See generally NOETHER & MAY, supra note 17 (discussing the benefits of hospital
mergers).
273. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
274. Since 2008, the FTC’s actions have led to the abandonment of six hospital mergers.
David J. Balan, Hospital Mergers That Don’t Happen, NEJM CATALYST (Oct. 24, 2016),
https://catalyst.nejm.org/hospital-mergers-dont-happen/ [https://perma.cc/2CKZ-RWNM].
275. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
276. See supra Parts I.D, II.D.
277. This Note does not take a stance on the standard that should be applied in analyzing
efficiencies that may result from mergers in other industries. This Note argues specifically
that agencies and courts should lower the standard for health-care providers because of the
high likelihood that efficiencies will benefit life and health.
278. See supra Part I.C.
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mergers should not be enjoined.279 The overly simplistic treatment of the
efficiency defense by courts suggests that courts may be uncomfortable
analyzing merger efficiencies.280 The Horizontal Merger Guidelines were
updated in 2010 to cure biases that undervalued efficiencies, yet courts often
make up their minds about a transaction without giving efficiency arguments
much weight or attention.281
The Supreme Court, in three cases, expressed its hesitance to accept
arguments that efficiencies generated from a merger could overcome a
presumption of anticompetitive effects.282 Courts have latched onto the
language of these cases and remain skeptical of efficiency arguments because
of the precedent set by the Supreme Court.283 The precedent that courts
continue to rely on, however, is from the 1960s, when the efficiency defense
was first introduced in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines and there was
strong hesitancy to accept any type of efficiency defense.284
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines have continued to evolve.285 Today,
efficiency arguments are credited by agencies in their investigatory review of
mergers,286 but courts remain hesitant because they rely on an outdated
ideology.287 Courts have expressed a willingness to allow a merger that will
result in “extraordinary efficiencies,” yet no court has ever ratified a
transaction on this basis.288 As the law stands, it is unclear what constitutes
an extraordinary efficiency. Going forward, courts need to be aware of the
role that efficiencies have played in antitrust merger review and how that role
has developed. Without understanding the evolution of the efficiency
defense, courts cannot understand that they are relying on outdated
precedents.
Although precedent is obviously important in the American common law
system, judicial interpretations of laws have developed over time in many
fields in response to changing social ideology, new empirical evidence, and
more.289 Similar to other areas of law, the antitrust laws should be interpreted
as a fluid body of law that must adapt with the times. Because of the possible
279. Blair, Durrance & Sokol, supra note 155, at 58.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 58–59.
282. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967); United States v. Phila. Nat’l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
283. See, e.g., FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 347–48 (3d Cir. 2016).
284. See supra notes 198–200 and accompanying text.
285. See supra Part II.A.
286. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
287. See supra text accompanying note 284.
288. Penn State Hershey, 838 F.3d at 347; Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.–Nampa Inc. v. St.
Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 790 (9th Cir. 2015); FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d
708, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1223–24 (11th
Cir. 1991).
289. See Adrian Vermeule, Optimal Abuse of Power, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 673, 684 (2015)
(noting that “extant law becomes risibly maladapted to the relevant problems as the policy
environment changes over time”). See generally, e.g., Emma Green, Gay Marriage Is Now a
Constitutional Right in the United States of America, ATLANTIC (June 26, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/gay-marriage-legal-in-the-unitedstates-of-america/396947/ [https://perma.cc/3LXV-CJNA].
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benefits to patients from hospital mergers,290 courts should value parties’
efficiency arguments more heavily. Part III.A.1 argues that efficiencies
should only be discredited for failing to be merger-specific when perfect
substitutes exist. Part III.A.2 contends that courts and agencies should not
require proof that efficiencies will result. Part III.A.3 discusses the error in
the Third Circuit’s decision in Penn State Hershey and argues that
anticompetitive reductions in output should only be found when the current
output will be decreased, not when failure to achieve an increase in output
may occur.
1. Alternatives to Merger-Specific Efficiencies
Should Be Perfect Substitutes
As discussed previously, courts require efficiencies, especially cost-saving
efficiencies, to be merger-specific.291 However, the standard for hospital
mergers is currently very high.292 Parties are often unable to prevail on
efficiency arguments when other contractual arrangements could be utilized
instead.293 However, efficiencies from contractual arrangements are not
perfect substitutes for the efficiencies that could be gained from a merger.294
Many hospital leaders believe that efficiencies will not be as extensive or
durable if sought through looser affiliation agreements, for several possible
reasons: (1) “[l]ack of accountability and long-term commitment,”
(2) “[i]nability to align incentives sufficiently to make the difficult choices
necessary to substantially improve the efficiency of care delivery,”
(3) “[a]cquirers’ unwillingness to invest substantial capital without
commitment for the returns on the investment,” (4) “[l]egal or regulatory
prohibitions on sharing financial information as well as detailed clinical
information,” (5) “[r]eluctance to share valuable intellectual property with a
loose affiliate,” and (6) “[f]ailure to create a common culture.”295
Requiring that efficiencies be merger-specific to rebut a presumption of
anticompetitive effects makes sense. It would be preferable and generate the
most benefits if efficiencies could be achieved without reducing competition.
However, the idea that contractual arrangements may have the same longterm effects as a merger neglects the realities of the health-care industry.
Because hospital executives fear that contractual arrangements will be short
term, they are not likely to invest any savings in future care and innovation.296
If the parties believe the arrangement is only temporary, any savings are

290. See generally NOETHER & MAY, supra note 17 (discussing possible postmerger
benefits to patients).
291. See supra Parts I.D, II.D.
292. See Part II.D for a discussion of the arguments that parties typically pose in support
of a merger and why they fail in court.
293. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
294. NOETHER & MAY, supra note 17, at 10–11.
295. Id. at 10.
296. See id. at 11.
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likely to be maintained and protected, not reinvested in service
improvements.297
Even if a contractual arrangement could produce the efficiencies in the
short term, courts also need to realize the benefits of long-term solutions.
Long-term solutions likely give hospital executives the confidence to reinvest
cost savings.298 The lasting result of efficiencies from long-term solutions
should be crucial to the analysis of whether there is a lessening of
competition. The FTC has argued that contractual arrangements are
sufficient to have the same effect and at least one court has agreed.299
Contracts may have the same effect in the short term, but the benefit of a
merger is that the effect will last in the long term. Savings are typically
greater over a longer period of time and more likely to benefit patients.300
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines state that agencies will not discount
efficiency arguments when there is a “less restrictive alternative that is
merely theoretical.”301 Similarly, courts should evaluate the real-life
practicality of substitutes that may create efficiencies without the proposed
merger. Courts should look beyond the theoretical possibility that another
arrangement could create the same efficiencies and only discount efficiency
arguments on merger-specificity grounds when there is proof that another
arrangement will create the exact benefits that the merger will produce. A
close substitute should not be enough.
2. Parties Should Not Be Required to Verify Efficiencies
When the FTC seeks to prove that a hospital merger will be
anticompetitive, it may show, despite uncertainty, that a merger is likely to
be anticompetitive because the merged firm will have a higher market share
or the market will be more concentrated.302 The FTC does not need to show
anticompetitive effects will, in fact, occur, only that they are likely.303
However, merging parties’ efficiency arguments must be verifiable—an
unfairly high standard.304

297. See id.
298. See id.
299. Id. at 10; Oliver & Leibenluft, supra note 7, at 21. The district court in St. Luke’s
discounted the parties’ arguments that the ability to share the cost of transitioning to an
electronic patient record system was a merger-specific efficiency. The court found the
efficiencies claimed could not rebut the presumption of anticompetitive effects because the
efficiencies could be achieved through another method. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.–Nampa
Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., No. 1:12-CV-00560-BLW, 2014 WL 407446, at *23 (D.
Idaho Jan. 24, 2014), aff’d, 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015).
300. See NOETHER & MAY, supra note 17, at 12–13.
301. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, § 10.
302. See supra Part I.D.
303. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
304. See Daniel A. Crane, Rethinking Merger Efficiencies, 110 MICH. L. REV. 347, 348
(2011) (“[M]erger law implicitly requires a greater degree of predictive proof of mergergenerated efficiencies than it does of merger-generated social costs.”).
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It is very difficult to verify efficiency claims, especially those relating to
quality improvements.305 First, there is little historical data on quality
measures.306 Second, there are varying opinions as to what constitutes best
practices, which make it unclear how sharing practices will be beneficial.307
Third, this benefit is not necessarily merger-specific and could be
accomplished merely by discussing best-care practices with consultants.308
Lastly, there is conflicting evidence on whether mergers lead to improved
quality.309 Thus, efficiency arguments often are very difficult to prove.310
Because research and evidence remain split on whether mergers truly
generate efficiencies, especially efficiencies affecting quality, courts have
remained hesitant to credit efficiency arguments.311 Yet it is unlikely that
economists and practitioners will ever agree on what constitutes a quality
increase, how to measure one, and how to identify a quality-adjusted price
postmerger. Amid debates over what constitutes quality, it is unreasonably
difficult for merging parties to prove that quality efficiencies will result.
Thus, in evaluating efficiency claims, courts need to lower the burden of
proof on the efficiency defense. Courts should instead evaluate whether the
efficiencies asserted are plausible.
It is too difficult to know what will happen following a merger. This is
why the agencies must only show that a presumption of anticompetitive
effects is likely. It is unfair to require that merging parties anticipate and
convince the court of what will occur postmerger when they have no ability
to know what will happen. Although merging parties are in the best position
to make the claimed efficiencies happen, there needs to be some trust by
courts that health-care providers will seek to provide the best quality of care
to their patients. Merging parties have great incentive to do so because they
need to recruit and maintain patients and health plans. Poor patient outcomes
may result in press nightmares and loss of their patient base.312
3. The Flaw in Penn State Hershey: Reductions in Output
Should Only Be Considered from Current Levels
The Third Circuit in Penn State Hershey correctly recognized that the
efficiencies, which would have been created by allowing Hershey to use

305. There is no standard dictating how to measure quality of health care. CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R40749, MEASURING HEALTH CARE QUALITY:
MEASURE DEVELOPMENT,
ENDORSEMENT, AND IMPLEMENTATION 2 (2009); see also Kristin Madison, The Law and Policy
of Health Care Quality Reporting, 31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 215, 218–19 (2009). Without a
uniform standard for measuring quality, parties face immense difficulties proving that quality
improvements will result. See Yao & Dahdough, supra note 132, at 29–30.
306. Oliver & Leibenluft, supra note 7, at 22.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
310. Sokol & Fishkin, supra note 133, at 55 n.39.
311. See supra Part II.C.
312. See generally, e.g., Tamar Lapin, Hospital Probed for 6-Year-Old Boy’s Heated
Blanket Death, N.Y. POST (Aug. 29, 2017), https://nypost.com/2017/08/29/hospital-probedfor-6-year-old-boys-heated-blanket-death/ [https://perma.cc/64QC-DTUU].
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Pinnacle’s excess capacity, were merger-specific.313 Hershey had proposed
building a new one-hundred-bed tower to alleviate its capacity constraint.314
Even though the bed tower was a nonmerger remedy that was available to the
parties, the court correctly found the efficiencies were merger-specific
because the efficiencies that would have been generated by building the bed
tower in the absence of the merger would not have been realized in the same
way.315 Building the bed tower would have been more expensive and time
consuming, while the merger efficiencies could have been achieved much
faster.316
Instead, the Third Circuit erred in finding that the merger would lead to an
anticompetitive reduction in output.317 The district court found convincing
evidence that the merger would alleviate capacity constraints and refrained
from questioning the business judgment of the Hershey officers who testified
that, without the merger, the bed tower would be necessary.318 However, on
appeal, the Third Circuit found that the “evidence [was] ambiguous at best
that Hershey needed to construct a 100-bed tower to alleviate its capacity
constraints.”319 The court then went on to find that “Hershey’s ability to
forego building the 100-bed tower [would be] a reduction in output.”320 Yet
the court failed to explain why this would be a reduction in output. It seems
that the court confused output and capacity. The court seemingly viewed this
as a choice between (1) no bed tower (i.e., no expansion) and (2) building a
new bed tower (i.e., expansion). The court ruled in favor of expansion based
on its belief that if Hershey did not expand its facilities, it would be reducing
its output.321
This view is wholly misguided and makes little sense. First, the court
found that Hershey did not need to increase its capacity.322 Second, the court
found that Hershey could not merge because doing so would lessen its
expansion and result in fewer patients being served.323 This is simply not
true. Hershey sought to increase its output postmerger by allowing for more
patients to be cared for and housed at the acquired hospital, Pinnacle.324
Additionally, the court assumed that without the merger, the bed tower
would be built.325 However, many factors could have stymied Hershey’s
313. See FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 350 (3d Cir. 2016).
314. Id.
315. See id.
316. David Wenner, Hershey-Pinnacle Merger Hinges on Hearing This Week, PENN LIVE
(July 26, 2016), http://www.pennlive.com/news/2016/07/penn_state_hershey_ftc.html
[https://perma.cc/F6A8-MXF4].
317. Penn State Hershey, 838 F.3d at 350.
318. FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 185 F. Supp. 3d 552, 559–61 (M.D. Pa. 2016),
rev’d, 838 F.3d 327.
319. Penn State Hershey, 838 F.3d at 350.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Brief of Appellees Penn State Hershey Medical Center and PinnacleHealth System at
43, Penn State Hershey, 838 F.3d 327 (No. 16-2365).
325. See Penn State Hershey, 838 F.3d at 350.

2506

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

plan to build a new bed tower. For instance, the board of directors could have
refused to approve the $277 million capital expenditure project.326
Here, the court made up its mind without seriously analyzing the parties’
efficiency arguments.327 It realized that the efficiencies that could be derived
from creating a new bed tower were not a substitute for the immediate
solution the merger could provide to alleviate Hershey’s capacity-constraint
problem.328 Thus, the court needed some ground on which to discount the
parties’ efficiency arguments, and the requirement that efficiencies not
reduce output was a viable excuse.329 The court then went on to add a
catchall by stating that the merger was so likely to be anticompetitive that
only “extraordinarily great cognizable efficiencies” could rebut the
presumption of anticompetitive effects.330 Apparently, the Third Circuit did
not consider alleviating capacity constraints and increasing the hospital’s
ability to provide care an extraordinary efficiency.331
Courts need to engage in a deeper analysis of parties’ efficiency
arguments. Proposals to solve capacity constraints, in lieu of a merger that
would also solve those issues, cannot be deemed certain to occur. Finding
that the proposed merger would render another viable option unnecessary
should not be a ground for discrediting an efficiency. If courts continue to
do so, parties, like Hershey, who are pursuing a merger, may be deterred from
simultaneously considering alternative capacity-constraint solutions. If
parties wait to find alternative solutions and the court enjoins their proposed
merger, the process for finding alternative solutions will take much more
time. The capacity issues the parties already face might not be resolved as
quickly, causing patients to suffer.
B. Agencies and Courts Should Consider Cross-Market
Merger Effects in Evaluating Horizontal Mergers
As discussed in Part I.E, one way in which hospitals compete is for
inclusion in health insurance plans.332 A hospital’s bargaining power in this
exchange is essential to competition. Yet the agencies and courts do not
326. See supra notes 265–66 and accompanying text. As of this writing, Hershey is not
planning to build a new bed tower but instead is “considering a build-and-shuffle approach.”
Stauffer, supra note 266. Hershey is “planning to add on to the children’s hospital, move
[women’s services and the neonatal intensive care unit], and see how things look in a couple
years.” Id. It is also currently “add[ing] a 12-bed observation unit and expand[ing] the
emergency department.” Id.
327. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
328. Penn State Hershey, 838 F.3d at 350.
329. See id. Research, to date, has not identified any other hospital merger case where
efficiencies were discredited based on a finding that there would be an anticompetitive
reduction in output.
330. Penn State Hershey, 838 F.3d at 350 (quoting HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES,
supra note 12, § 10). The Third Circuit’s ruling neither explicitly adopted nor rejected the
efficiency defense as a viable argument, which leaves uncertainty about its application in the
future. Recent Case, FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327 (3d Cir. 2016), 130
HARV. L. REV. 1736, 1743 (2017).
331. Penn State Hershey, 838 F.3d at 350.
332. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.

2018]

MERGERS AND PATIENT PROTECTION

2507

currently consider how different parties’ bargaining powers affect
competition in the market.333 This may be because the agencies and courts
assume that parties’ market shares are an accurate reflection of their
bargaining power. However, as the research by Vistnes and Sarafidis, and
Dafny, Ho, and Lee, suggests, cross-market merged firms may have
substantial bargaining power in markets where their market share is not very
high.334 Theoretically, a cross-market merged hospital could have twice the
bargaining power of another hospital, while also having half the output—that
is, market share.
In the past six years, there has been a drastic increase in consolidation
among health-care providers resulting in the formation of major hospital
systems.335 To adjust to the reality of these sprawling health systems, the
antitrust laws should allow consolidation among smaller parties that seek to
compete with larger systems. Merging parties should be permitted to
demonstrate to the agencies and courts that their proposed merger will allow
them to increase their bargaining power and overcome the disparity in power
between them and the larger health-care systems with whom they compete.
For instance, the parties in Penn State Hershey could have argued that they
sought to merge to better compete with several megasystems: University of
Pennsylvania Health System (“Penn Medicine”),336 Geisinger Health System
(“Geisinger”),337 Community Health Systems (CHS),338 and WellSpan
Health System (“WellSpan”).339 Because these systems offer payers more
hospitals throughout Pennsylvania to fill holes in the payers’ health plans,
cross-market research would suggest these systems have greater bargaining
power than their market shares indicate.340

333. Agencies and courts instead consider the parties’ postmerger market power—an
abstract concept derived from market share and market-concentration statistics. HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, § 1; see also Louis Kaplow, On the Relevance of Market
Power, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1303, 1304–06 (2017).
334. See supra Part I.E.
335. Jeffrey A. Singer, Obamacare’s Catch 22, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 11, 2016, 3:15 PM),
https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-08-11/obamacare-gave-rise-to-the-healthcare-mergers-its-advocates-oppose [https://perma.cc/53Y7-QG4J].
336. University of Pennsylvania Health System includes five hospitals. See Penn Medicine
Locations, PENN MED., https://www.pennmedicine.org/for-patients-and-visitors/pennmedicine-locations [https://perma.cc/C3BN-WRQA] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).
337. Geisinger Health System operates eleven hospitals in various markets. See Locations,
GEISINGER, https://www.geisinger.org/patient-care/find-a-location [https://perma.cc/ZD747VZU] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).
338. Community Health Systems owns 127 hospitals in twenty states. See Locations,
COMMUNITY
HEALTH
SYSTEMS,
http://www.chs.net/serving-communities/locations/
[https://perma.cc/N7NB-YPSN] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).
339. WellSpan Health System owns and operates six hospitals. See WellSpan Hospitals,
WELLSPAN HEALTH, http://www.wellspan.org/offices-locations/hospitals/?utm_source=
Website&utm_medium=Mega%20Menu&utm_campaign=Hospitals
[https://perma.cc/ZZ4R-T6WM] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).
340. See generally Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 163 (discussing the employer-choice
and health-plan-pricing models for analyzing price effects following cross-market mergers);
Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 158 (discussing the common-customers model for analyzing
cross-market merger-related price increases).
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The merging parties in Penn State Hershey did, in fact, argue that the
merger would not produce anticompetitive effects because its competitors—
Penn Medicine, Geisinger, CHS, and WellSpan—would respond to the
merger by offering substitutable products, which would sufficiently constrain
prices following the merger.341 However, despite finding that this response
would “assuage some of the concerns that the proposed combination will
have anticompetitive effects,” the Third Circuit rejected this argument
because payers testified that Pinnacle and Hershey were necessary to their
networks.342 The court recognized that Hershey and Pinnacle would face
difficulties competing with such large, well-known, reputable systems.343
However, the court ultimately could not find persuasive legal reasoning on
which to allow the merger on this ground.
With an increasing amount of evidence and research suggesting that crossmarket mergers have real effects on competition,344 the agencies and courts
need to be willing to look deeper into the interactions among the relevant
payers, parties, competitors, and patients. Research should find a way to
quantify parties’ bargaining power. If this could be achieved, bargaining
power may be a better proxy for hospital market share than patient discharge
data. Research is necessary to understand exactly how much a cross-market
merger increases the bargaining power of one hospital relative to the
bargaining power of its market rivals.
In the meantime, without such research, agencies and courts should
evaluate the relative strength of merging hospitals’ competitors based on
reputation and cross-market connections. The agencies should accept this
efficiency argument and add it to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. The
Guidelines should advise parties that they may succeed by showing their
ability to compete will be enhanced postmerger and that merging will allow
them to compete with cross-market merged firms that have a stronger
bargaining position. Market share in the hospital context should only be used
as a baseline from which efficiency arguments (e.g., that mergers will lead to
improved quality or more effective competition) should be given greater
weight to tip the scale in favor of allowing hospitals to merge.345
CONCLUSION
Although courts remain skeptical, there are compelling reasons why
certain efficiencies should be sufficient to rebut a presumption of
anticompetitive effects. Efficiencies are an integral part of the competition
analysis and have the potential to bring considerable benefits to consumers.
Mergers between health-care providers can strengthen competition and lead
to cost savings and improved care for patients. Because of their benefits,
341. FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 351–52 (3d Cir. 2016).
342. Id. at 352.
343. See id. at 351–52.
344. See supra Part I.E.
345. Scholars have similarly argued that market share should not be the sole factor in
determining parties’ market power. Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande & Steven C.
Salop, Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 241, 259 (1987).
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efficiencies should be given greater weight, especially in analyses relating to
health-care mergers, where the efficiencies gained will likely result in better
patient outcomes. After all, life and health are more important than the price
one may pay.

